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Abstract 
This paper highlights that the question of policy space with respect to public support to electricity 
cannot be answered by clinically isolating legal rules from their factual background – constituted of 
technological innovations, market developments and the broader political economy. Various stylized 
scenarios in the green economy are briefly assessed to determine the impact subsidy rules may have. A 
more general assessment of the SCM Agreement leads to the conclusion that WTO subsidy laws are 
uncertain and - inasmuch as they may not be fully in line with best green policy prescriptions - 
unsound. In the face of a prospect of more frictions and litigation, legal security must be positively 
reinstated. The case-law may contribute to clarify some issues but the more fundamental decisions 
determining what is, and what is not, legitimate are beyond its purview and competence. For this 
reason, the recent Appellate Body decision in the Canada – Renewable Energy/ FIT disputes, with its 
construction of the benefit analysis, is essentially wrong. The paper concludes by arguing that the only 
real option for a clear and legitimate recognition of green policy space resides with law reform. In this 
regard, acknowledging that reform is not only an outcome but first of all a process preparing for a 
negotiated outcome, various suggestions for the way forward are outlined. 
Keywords 
Subsidies – clean energy – WTO – SCM Agreement – law reform 
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1. Introduction: the goal of the paper
*
 
Much has been written on this topic, especially lately. Many of the points I am making here are not 
new. Many scholars, including myself, have made them.
1
 It is worth, however, to consolidate few 
ideas, build on them and reach further. Indeed the area is complex and is evolving fast, many issues – 
including legal ones – are still wide open, and thus need continuous analysis to find an answer. 
This paper, in particular, attempts to highlight that the key question of policy space with respect to 
public support to electricity cannot be answered by clinically isolating legal rules from their factual 
background – constituted of technological innovations, market developments and the broader political 
economy. Viewed from this perspective, the legal analysis must start when the technological, 
commercial and political considerations expounded in the other contributions to this collection are 
fully internalized. 
The second contribution of the paper is more conceptual and dwells on the analysis of two ideas 
that are considered very useful to visualize the question of (green) policy space and subsidy laws: the 
notions of point of balance and trade-off. 
The factual and background dimension of the issue of green policy autonomy is analyzed in 
Section 2. Section 3 then examines what the law says about government policies in support of green 
energy and in particular electricity. Section 4 is the conceptual core of the paper, revolving around the 
said notions of point of balance and trade-off. Section 5 shifts the focus from the laws to the courts – 
as the prominent actors called to interpret and apply them. Reference is in particular made to the WTO 
Panels and the Appellate Body, and to the most recent jurisprudence with an impact on the issue of 
green policy space, ie the Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT dispute. Section 6 closes with few remarks 
on law reform. 
2. Facts and law 
This section provides an easy heuristic to understand the key determinants of the issue of green policy 
space. 
The question of ‘policy space’ or autonomy for green subsidies is as much factual as it is legal. 
Good lawyers and judges are those that first of all master the facts. Making a step further, and quoting 
the Chicago sociologist Charles Henderson, Louis Brandeis famously held that a lawyer who has not 
studied sociology or economics is very apt to become a public enemy.
2
 The claim of this paper does 
not go as far as requiring radical changes in law schools curricula or in legal training. But I want to 
immediately emphasize that the question of policy autonomy heavily depends on the factual – ie the 
technology, market, political economy conditions – that are or will be prevailing in the green 
electricity sector. 
From the legal perspective, this is the main contribution that this World Trade Forum has brought 
to advance knowledge in the area. Explain to us lawyers what is and will soon be possible in terms of 
trade in electricity. This is the precondition for having scenarios where support to generation of 
                                                     
*
 I would like to thank the participants in the World Trade Forum 2014 (27 September 2014, Berne), and in particular Jesse 
Kreier, Rob Howse and Thomas Cottier, for useful comments to a preliminary version of this paper. The paper will be 
published in Thomas Cottier and Ilaria Espa (ed) International Trade in Electricity and the Decarbonisation of the 
Economy. The World Trade Forum 2014. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Any mistake is attributable to 
the author. 
1
 See, eg, Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wasting Time No More. Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy 
Space and Law Reform’ (2012) Journal of International Economic Law, 525-579, id, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. 
Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis from the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies’ (2015) 
World Trade Review (forthcoming). 
2
 Louis Brandeis, ‘The Living Law’ (1916) Illinois Law Review, p. 470. 
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electricity, which is then traded, can possibly give rise to causes of action. In what is certainly a very 
simplified chain, the technology comes first. When this exists, the focus then shifts to the market and 
the government as key actors, often partnering with each other to make the technology as broadly as 
possible available. If the public hand can sustain market possibilities, it can also cause distortions. In 
an internationally competitive market these distortions can raise diplomatic rows. Finally, if the right 
political conditions are there, these claims can trigger legal remedies and complaints. The arsenal used 
to fight these disputes is the prevailing regulatory framework. It is within this simplified, but certainly 
complex, background that one can ask and answer questions of the policy autonomy available to 
government wishing to support green electricity. 
In sum, the key questions lawyers need to have progressively answered before making any final 
assessment on the degree of policy autonomy are the following: 
 What is the technology with respect to the generation, storage transmission and distribution of 
electricity? What does it or will it permit?  
 What type of cross-border trade can we think of?  
 How fast will the markets respond to these technological possibilities?  
 What role will public support play?  
 Do we have the conditions for harm been done? 
 Who will complain for subsidies granted to electricity (ie generation, storage, transmission and 
distribution)? 
 What are the conditions for disputes to arise? Do we have them? 
We can use few stylized scenarios to further elucidate the framework of this inquiry. In the following 
section, where we analyze the regulatory framework in some more detail, we will hint at the technical 
issues that may affect the viability or otherwise of a subsidy law claim. 
Scenario 1. Subsidy to green technology 
From the trade law perspective, this is the so far most common scenario. Public support to green 
technology (eg solar panels, wind turbines) has been significant. Since this technology, in the shape of 
final products or inputs, is extensively traded, public support can clearly impact international trade. 
This may lead to subsidy claims being filed with the WTO dispute settlement or to unilateral remedies 
(ie countervailing duties) being imposed in the affected jurisdictions. Most of the disputes that have 
triggered the recent ‘trade war’ regard this category of support.3 
Scenario 2. Subsidy to green energy 
Public support to green energy (in the form of, for example, support to R&D or production) raises two 
questions, again from a trade law perspective.  
First, we need to know whether there is any international trade in the commodity. There is certainly 
trade in gas and fuels (including both bio- or fossil fuels). As the workshop made clear, the issue is 
still more open with respect to electricity. On the one hand, we certainly have cross-border trade at the 
regional level but, quite often, the commonality of the participants (think for example at intra-EU 
electricity trade) make challenges difficult. On the other hand, the idea of a ‘global grid’ is still very 
much speculation with different arguments (mainly technological viability vs investment magnitude) 
being confronted with each other. Due to the specificity of the electricity sector, we will deal with this 
as a separate scenario below. 
                                                     
3
 For an overview of these cases, see, eg, Mark Wu and James Salzman, ‘The Next Generation of Trade and Environment 
Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy’ (2014) Northwestern University Law Review, pp. 401-474. With 
specific respect to trade remedies (including countervailing duties) see the contribution of Edwin Vermulst to this book. 
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Secondly, one can have a trade law claims that is not necessarily targeting public support to the 
green generation of energy but rather other aspects or conditions of that policy of support which have 
an impact on other (green but not necessarily) markets. The main economic and political mischief of 
the Ontario FIT Programme, subject to review in the Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT case was not 
the feed-in tariff in itself but rather the various types of local-content requirements attached to it. This 
leads us back to the first scenario – ie subsidy to green technology. 
This second consideration leads us to make an important point. At least in principle, we can have a 
trade law, and particularly as subsidy law, issue, even if there is no cross-border trade of a significant 
aspect of the policy. In the Ontario case, there was no trade in electricity but there was certainly trade 
in the inputs subject to the localization requirement. 
Furthermore, since support can also be granted indirectly, one can also wonder whether, through 
the direct support to energy generation, one government is effectively (and indirectly) supporting also 
the producers of the equipment and inputs used to generate green energy. (The same consideration 
obviously applies to green electricity.) To put it another way, various markets (and obviously 
countries) can be affected by a subsidy.
4
 The law does reflect this economic reality through the 
doctrine of ‘pass-through’ of the benefit of the subsidy. 
Scenario 3. Subsidy to green electricity 
This can encompass trade to the generation of green electricity but also to its transmission and 
distribution, or storage. While, as we are about to see below, claims with respect to the transmission, 
distribution or storage are more difficult to visualize, one could certainly have claims focusing on one 
government’s support to production. The key issues then become: 
 Is there any cross-border trade in the generated electricity? 
 Who will complain of the distorting measure of support? 
 Competing conventional energy producers? 
 Other (less-subsidized) competing green energy producers?
5
 
Clearly, the answers to these questions are in the main not legal. We must interrogate the technological 
and market possibilities, as well as the political economy. 
Scenario 4. Subsidy to support transmission, distribution (ie the grid) or storage 
Governments may also invest in infrastructure, be it for the storage of electricity or for its long- or 
short-distance transportation. It is clear that in some cases, think of cross-border transmission, we have 
by definition a cross-border element. This should therefore not be an obstacle to the application of 
trade laws. 
                                                     
4
 One key fact, which masterly shows the indirect and transnational impact of subsidization in the green sector, was often-
repeated in the workshop. What created the Chinese green technology (eg solar panel) industry were German subsidies to 
promote green electricity generation. 
5
 Given the pervasive public support in the green energy sector, and the co-existence of various national support 
programmes, it is difficult to find one national industry completely ‘clean’ (‘I have not received any support, but my 
foreign competitor did!’). The economic and competition issue is often one of ‘net effects’ (‘My competitor is more aided 
than me!’). This is exactly what the United Steelworkers Union (USW), which filed a section 301 petition with the US 
government in September 2010, interestingly claimed. The American union complained that the Chinese producers had 
received ‘more than twice as much as the U.S. spent in the sector’. See Keith Bradsher, ‘Union Accuses China of Illegal 
Clean Energy Subsidies’, New York Times, 9 September 2010. For a commentary see Scott Lincicome, ‘USW to China: 
Subsidies for Me, but not for Thee’, 9 September 2010, available at http://lincicome.blogspot.it/2010/09/usw-to-china-
green-subsidies-for-me-but.html (last accessed 1 October 2014). 
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There is, however, another angle which represents, in our view, the key legal question to address. 
As we are about to explain, subsidies can be challenged under WTO subsidy laws, only inasmuch as 
they are determined to be specific to certain enterprises or sectors. General subsidies, ie subsidies 
available across the board, are not objectionable. Now, can we visualize a claim against electricity 
infrastructure? Is this infrastructure, which is provided (partly or fully) by the government, ‘general’ or 
‘specific’? More to the point: can we build a claim of specificity vis-à-vis the electricity sector? Or, 
should rather the infrastructure be viewed as the physical vehicle to transmit and distribute electricity 
to all those that are connected to the network? What if a significant infrastructure is built in a remote 
region, where the predominant if not exclusive customer is a company engaged in international trade? 
Again – one can see that, at least at the level of speculation, it is possible to consider various factual 
scenarios. It looks like, however, that these type of claims, as, in general subsidy claims related to 
infrastructure provision, would be difficult to succeed.
6
 
Scenario 5. Subsidy to for energy consumption 
The last scenario is that where subsidies are not channelled to the energy producer but to the 
consumers. The first, important question to determine the applicability of subsidy laws is always that 
related to the existence of cross-border trade in the products/markets that can be affected by the 
subsidized demand. The second set of questions focus on the type of subsidy at issue. In particular, is 
this subsidy broadly available (for example, to all energy produced through clean sources) or is only 
targeted to certain sectors? To put it another way, is it technology-neutral or is it designed to spur a 
certain, comparatively disadvantaged, green source? As already noted, the more targeted and specific 
subsidies are the more likely it is they may have problems under subsidy laws. We will return to this 
key issue when discussing the law, and, in particular, the specificity requirement. 
3. Green electricity support. What does the law say? 
After a very brief overview of the regulatory framework coming out from the SCM Agreement,
7
 this 
section attempts to show that WTO subsidy disciplines are both seriously unclear and unsound. 
The subsidy regulatory framework: a primer 
It is immediately important to highlight that WTO law does not object to subsidies in themselves. 
Being a trade discipline, subsidies are objected to only if the subsidy causes some form of negative 
trade effects, as defined in the laws. This crucial element has already been repeatedly highlighted in 
the previous section. 
In terms of legal analysis, there are three successive steps to make. 
First, subsidy disciplines can only apply if one given measure is first defined as a subsidy under the 
requirements of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. In particular, to be deemed as a subsidy, a measure: 
o must be granted by a government (or a public body which is equaled to the government), 
o it must confer one of the given forms of financial contribution (or alternatively constitute any form 
of income or price support),
8
 and 
                                                     
6
 For two cases where infrastructure subsidies claims were tested see the EC – Aircraft, WT/DS316, and US – Aircraft, 
WT/DS353. 
7
 A more detailed account can be found in Luca Rubini, Juhi Sud, Edwin Vermulst, Global Approach of State Aid Law - 
WTO Subsidy Law and EU Trade Defence instruments (Oxford University Press, 2015, forthcoming). 
8
 According to Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, ‘there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: (i) a government 
practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
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o it must be economically beneficial. 
In addition, only subsidies that are specific to certain firms or industries are caught by the disciplines.
9
 
Thirdly and finally, as already noted, specific subsidies are permitted unless they cause adverse 
effects in one of the forms defined by the SCM Agreement (see Articles 5 and 6), or unless they are 
conditional on exports or on the use of local inputs (see Article 3). 
Each step of this legal analysis raises important legal issues which all contribute to determining the 
scope of autonomy of governments. 
First claim: subsidy laws are uncertain 
Subsidy laws are notoriously uncertain. The regulation of public support to electricity is no exception. 
One can think of two reasons why this is particularly so. First, the electricity sector and its market are 
complex. Secondly, when subsidy laws were conceived, trade in electricity was certainly not in the 
mind of the framers.  
While not aiming at being exhaustive, the following is a brief list that sketches the main areas of 
uncertainty of subsidy laws which may have a specific impact on public support to electricity. 
a) What does amount to a financial contribution? The various forms of financial contribution do 
still raise many questions (for example, can we have a cumulative application of more than one letter?) 
but the most relevant for support to electricity arguably focus on the interpretation of the requirements 
when a third-party is involved in the transfer of economic resources (see item (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) 
of the SCM Agreement). This depends on the distinct regulatory nature of many measures of support 
in this field, where the action of subsidization involves both public and private agents. 
b) What is the status of tax incentives? The language of the ‘otherwise due’ clause has already 
caused headaches to adjudicators.
10
 But this is only the beginning. We have never had any dispute 
where energy or environmental taxes were under scrutiny.
11
 This may require an interesting analysis of 
the ‘objectives’ of these tax measures and an interesting search for general rules and exceptions. EU 
State aid law offers good examples of the difficulties of this type of enquiry.
12
 
c) What is the status of ‘regulatory’ measures? The status of regulatory measures under subsidy 
laws is a recurring issue and is still the true ‘elusive frontier’ of subsidy laws, in much the same way 
as it happens for EU State aid law. To stay in the field of green energy subsidies, one can think of the 
2001 PreussenElektra decision where the European Court of Justice famously held that the German 
FIT was not a State aid. The Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT ruling in the WTO has given some 
(Contd.)                                                                  
incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to 
carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments.’ While the case-
law on the financial contribution requirement, in its various forms is already rich, there is virtually no interpretation of the 
‘any form of income or price support’ alternative which may have an important potential in the area of green energy 
support. It looks, in particular, very reasonable to conclude that certain measures such as feed-in tariffs or renewable 
portfolio standards may well amount to a form of ‘price or income support’. 
9
 Article 2 of the SCM Agreement outlines the sophisticated tests to establish specificity. A subsidy will be deemed 
specific if it is specific in law or de facto. Crucially, subsidies that are granted according to ‘objective criteria and 
conditions’ are not held to be specific. We will delve into the important, and still open, legal issues arising out from these 
three tests below. 
10
 See, eg, the US – FSC (WT/DS 108) litigation. For an extensive analysis see Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and 
State Aid – WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 9. 
11
 See the contribution of Kateryna Holzer, Ilaria Espa and Tetyana Payosova. 
12
 For a review of this case-law, see Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wasting Time No More’, n. 1, at pp. 535-537.  
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indications but many issues remain open and there is certainly no final statement of the law with 
respect to regulatory subsidies.  
d) What does ‘any form of income or price support’ actually mean? One big issue is what role this 
language will play with respect to the scope of the definition of subsidy. The issue is particularly 
relevant with respect to regulatory measures which are pervasive in the green energy sector, like those 
at issue in the Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT case. We have good, and arguably sound, guidelines 
coming from the Panel Report in the China – GOES decision13 but the question of the coverage of this 
provision with respect to regulatory measure has not been addressed yet. (In the Canada – Renewable 
Energy case, the Panel, seconded by the Appellate Body, did exercise judicial economy on the relevant 
claim put forward by the complaining parties.) 
e) What does ‘benefit’ mean? 
Against the specific – and unclear – language of many of the other requirements of the definition of 
subsidy, as well as of the specificity and adverse effects tests (for the latter two, see immediately 
below), the requirement that any government measure may cause concerns under WTO subsidy laws 
only if it confers a ‘benefit’ is clearly open-ended. It is indeed the legal language that is more easily 
apt to being used to consider and balance positive goals and effects of the subsidy. This is what 
happened in the Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT case. For the reasons, expounded at length below, 
this interpretative approach is seriously wrong and potentially undermines seriously the effectiveness 
of subsidy control as well as transparency. 
f) Is the specificity test really ‘specific’? Despite the length and sophistication of the legal language 
(and its three ‘principles’ under letters (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement), one if 
often left to wonder whether a given measure will be held to be specific or not.
14
 Better – against a 
clearly expansive approach in the interpretation of the test, one wonders when any measure will be 
held not to be specific. 
The key interpretative issue – which is still open – is the relationship between de facto specificity 
(letter (c) of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement) and the relevance of the cases where the subsidy is 
not specific because it is granted according to ‘objective criteria and conditions’ (letter (b)).15 In 
particular: Does de facto specificity always prevail? What is the real relevance of the ‘neutral and 
objective conditions’? Can the latter – despite the specific and suggestive language of the law16 – ever 
discard a finding of predominant benefit of the subsidy to certain firms or sectors only? It is often 
noted that the answer to this last question may potentially open up interesting possibilities for policy 
autonomy.
17
 
g) How difficult is it to prove adverse effects? If it is not automatically prohibited (because it 
directly impinges on exports or on localization), in order to be actionable, a subsidy needs to cause 
adverse effects. There are three types of adverse effects, under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, ie 
nullification and impairment of benefits, in the form of frustration of tariff concessions, injury and one 
                                                     
13
 Panel Report, China – GOES, WT/DS414/R, para. 7.86. 
14
 As the seasoned lawyer knows well, long and sophisticated language is often not the path to legal clarity, quite the 
contrary. 
15
 Which are defined as ‘criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over others, and 
which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as the number of employees or size of enterprises’. 
16
 The incipit of letter (c) reads: ‘If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the 
principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, 
other factors may be considered/’ 
17
 See, eg, Sadeq Bigdeli, ‘Resurrecting the Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering Question of 
“Green Space”’ (2011) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, p. 2-37, at pp. 22-23. See also Rob Howse, 
Securing Policy Space for Clean Energy Under the SCM Agreement: Alternative Approaches, E-15 ‘ThinkPiece’, 
Autumn 2013. 
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of the five forms of serious prejudice as outlined in Article 6. Now, all these ‘trade-impact’ standards 
present their own difficulties and uncertainties with the result that it may not be easy to prove adverse 
effects. As the analysis of the various factual scenarios in Section 2 has shown, to prove adverse 
effects in the electricity sector may be particularly challenging. 
Equally, the vagaries of these standards and the relevant evidence do arguably mean that no 
government can be pretty sure that its subsidies will never be found to cause adverse effects. We do, 
therefore, believe that the statement that the system does already offer policy autonomy, if 
governments abstain from causing adverse effects, is partly fallacious (we will go back to this point 
below). It looks clear to us that the regulatory framework, both in theory and in practice, involves a 
significant amount of legal uncertainty.
18
 If one wants to offer a definite and effective degree of 
protection to certain desirable subsidies, this cannot rest on the lack of adverse effects, but needs a 
positive recognition. 
One final gloss on the real meaning of legal uncertainty may be useful. Some may argue that the 
ambiguity in the law is positive because it means flexibility for governments. Various readings of the 
law are possible, satisfying the preferences and conduct of different Members. This may be true but 
only on one crucial negative condition. To be positive, ambiguity must be permissive but not divisive. 
If the legitimacy of different and contrasting readings of the law becomes an issue of contention, good 
flexibility turns into bad legal uncertainty. The next step is litigiousness and litigation. 
Second claim: subsidy laws are not sound  
What is referred to here is not a general critique about the economic soundness of WTO subsidy 
laws.
19
 The claim is more specific and centers on whether WTO subsidy laws, as they currently stand, 
are in line with what the best policy practice tell us with respect to good green subsidies. This is 
measured in terms of the goals and effectiveness of these measures in relation to these goals, in 
particular as they relate to environmental and security of supply considerations.
20
 In other words, there 
may certain features and prescriptions of the law that are clear. The question in this case is: If the law 
is clear, is it also sound? Are these legal prescriptions in line with good policy indications and 
guidelines?  
We return to these questions in the following section. Suffice underlining here that the question is 
only partly legal. It engages the ‘factual’ dimension of the issue of policy autonomy that we have 
stressed already at the beginning of the paper.
21
 
Two final glosses are necessary. First, when we ask whether the laws are ‘in line with’ the policy 
prescriptions, we not only point towards the scenario where blanket bans or prohibitions are legally 
enforceable. Arguably, the assessment of the laws would not be equally positive if the regulatory 
framework de facto renders certain measures of support, which are deemed to be desirable, apt at 
being challenged. In other words, what matters is the actual misalignment between law and good 
                                                     
18
 This claim is fully developed in Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More’, n. 1 above. 
19
 See Alan O. Sykes, ‘The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective’ (2010) Journal of 
Legal Analysis, pp. 473-523. 
20
 Although extremely common as motive for support, it is difficult to consider job creation as relevant benchmark for 
assessing subsidy laws are they are, or indeed for suggesting law reform. In other words, it is a fact that investment in the 
green energy sector will often generate jobs – and local ones – and that this is the public discourse that invariably 
surrounds the measure of support at issue. That being said, trade laws are concerned with negative trade spillovers and 
may taken on board the pursuit of legitimate public policy goals which are essentially non-economic (eg health, safety, 
environment, public morals). Economic or socio-economic objectives are at times relevant when they are horizontal, such 
as innovation promotion or regional development.  
21
 We may simply add, at this stage, that there is a significant agreement in the scholarship that the current rules are not up 
to the job to face the challenges of the XXIst century. The most common example made is that of climate change 
subsidies. See n. 41 below for some references. 
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policy, and the probability and scope of over-inclusion. In sum, the issue is one of degree of legal 
security. 
The second comment refers to the coherency of the system. Economics tells us that in some cases 
subsidies are first-best intervention. They are less trade-distorting than, for example, tariffs because 
they affect only one margin (the producer’s) rather than two (the producer’s and the consumer’s). If 
this is the case, one would expect the law to reflect this difference. In the GATT legal framework, 
tariffs or quotas may be eventually justified under the general exceptions of Article XX, even if they 
cause trade distortions. This is not the case for subsidies, however. Pending the complex legal issue of 
the applicability of GATT Article XX to subsidies, if one looks at the SCM Agreement, no exceptions 
for legitimate subsidies can be found (the old shelter of ‘non-actionable’ subsidies expired at the end 
of 1999). Do we have double standards? Is this apparent difference in treatment correct?
22
 We will 
return to this claim of lack of coherency between the GATT and the SCM Agreement.
23
 
4. Conceptualizing policy autonomy in regulation: point of balance and trade-offs 
The degree of policy space or autonomy is determined in two ways. If is first dictated by the scope of 
the definition of subsidy. It is intuitive that if a measure does not amount to a subsidy in the first place, 
it is out of the disciplines’ scope. Other rules, maybe even stricter rules, may apply but there is no 
issue under subsidy laws. If the application of these other rules and subsidy rules is cumulative, it is 
clear that the fact that the latter are not applicable means we have, at least in principle, more policy 
space. Less regulation intuitively means more autonomy. If the above is correct, one can clearly 
understand why many legal battles in WTO subsidy cases turn on the seemingly neutral and 
preliminary issue of the definition. 
Policy autonomy is also, and most importantly, determined by the actual content of the disciplines 
that are applicable to a measure that has been classified as a subsidy. The rules may expressly or, on 
construction, impliedly permit certain measures, or, rather, may prohibit them. We have seen the main 
tenets of current WTO subsidy laws. 
Two concepts are key when it comes to actually assess the degree of autonomy WTO subsidy rules 
give to governments: the point of balance and the idea of trade-off.  
Point of balance. The first attempts to identify the point of balance of the disciplines. Let’s use an 
example to explain this idea. In our case, we are talking of subsidies that want to promote the 
generation and use of green electricity and this is definitely and mainly linked to an environmental 
goal. The WTO legal regime in general and WTO subsidy rules in particular are trade disciplines. 
They want to foster trade liberalization and remove trade obstacles. Traditionally, however, trade laws 
have also recognized other-than-trade values and accepted that in certain cases there may be clashes 
between trade interests and non-trade interests. Crucially, for example under the general exceptions of 
GATT Article XX, it is also accepted that, under certain conditions, non-trade values may trump trade 
liberalization. In other words, in some cases, it is WTO legal to adopt measures that, although 
breaching in principle even fundamental trade obligations (like non discrimination or the prohibition 
of quotas), also pursue legitimate objectives in a proportionate way and do not entail unjustified 
discrimination. Going back, now, to the idea of point of balance, it is clear that, in the original 
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 This point is raised by Rob Howse, Climate Change Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy 
Analysis (Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2010). 
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 We can anticipate the main point made below, ie that there are various questions that need to be answered before 
concluding that one discipline is stricter/more generous than another and the mere fact that one includes exceptions or 
justifications is certainly not conclusive. Other relevant questions thus concern the relevant default rule and the allocation 
of the burden of proof. 
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regulatory framework of the GATT, in some cases this was tilted in favour of non-trade interests and 
values (and to the limited detriment of trade interests and values). 
Now, the key question is: where is the point of balance of subsidy rules? Arguably, when the rules 
on non-actionability were in force, the SCM Agreement and the GATT where partly aligned. The 
ethos (and balance) was the same. Trade distorting measures are objected too. In some cases, certain 
measures, even if trade distorting, are justified and permitted. With the expiry of Articles 8 and 9 of 
the SCM Agreement, the point of balance has been tilted and is now clearly swinging towards the 
trade camp. In sum, green or environmental subsidies are certainly permitted but only if they do not 
cause adverse trade effects (as defined by the various standards of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement). 
If they do – they are actionable. At least in principle, if the non-actionability provisions were still in 
force, or if – as some have argued – the general GATT Article XX exceptions were applicable to 
subsidies, we could, in some cases, have more policy space and autonomy, inasmuch as certain trade-
distorting measures would be acceptable (and could not be subject to legal challenge). 
Let’s elaborate a bit more on the comparison between the GATT, the original outline of the SCM 
Agreement (which we can call ‘SCM 1.0’) and the current version of the SCM Agreement (‘SCM 
2.0’), always through the angle of the point of balance. 
Under the GATT, if a measure discriminates against (or between) foreign product(s), or if it 
operates as an obstacle to market access, it is banned. This means that the threshold of intervention is 
substantially low. Quoting a common statement, Article III and Article XI of the GATT (and also the 
non-violation nullification and impairment route under Article XXIII:1 of the GATT) protect 
‘expectations’ and ‘competitive conditions’, not actual ‘volumes of trade’. In a nutshell, there is no 
need to prove the actual trade impact produced by the measure. But, if the general standard of 
prohibition of the GATT is rigorous, at the same time there are, at least in principle, significant 
opportunities for justification, represented by the general exceptions of GATT Article XX.
24
 Both 
prohibitions and possibilities for justification need to be accounted for when considering the point of 
balance of the GATT. 
Under the SCM Agreement, only certain subsidies are prohibited. The proof of the key legal 
requirement of conditionality is demanding but, when present, the ban is a foregone conclusion. 
Again, there is no need to prove actual trade effects. Crucially, however, the scope of the ban is 
limited to export and local content requirement (‘LCR’) subsidies which, in the eyes of the 
negotiators, were undoubtedly characterized by discrimination / protectionism. Thus the ban does not 
touch on the, arguably more important and broader group of domestic subsidies, whose discipline is 
really defining of the point of balance of the SCM Agreement.  
In brief, as we said already, subsidies are not prohibited in WTO subsidy disciplines. Apart from 
the case of export and LCR subsidies, there are no prohibitions in the SCM Agreement. Subsidies are 
simply actionable. And, as case-law shows, this is not easy to be proved. (Any data on WTO claims vs 
their success?). Crucially, it is worth recalling that the burden of proof is on the complainant. 
Most importantly, for our discussion on where the point of balance of the disciplines is, it is the 
fact that the original version of the SCM Agreement – SCM 1.0 – also included specific provisions 
making certain R&D, environmental and regional development subsidies non-actionable under WTO 
dispute settlement and countervailing duty actions. Hence – no prohibitions and limited justifications. 
What is the meaning of this extra-layer of protection? Arguably, the Uruguay Round negotiators 
wanted to be sure that certain (albeit limited) subsidies be granted the maximum possible degree of 
legal security. In other words, they do not consider the absence of prohibitions enough to ensure that 
certain measures be protected under subsidy laws. This also meant that, by granting the benefit of non-
actionability, they were accepting that certain subsidies could be causing adverse effects and still be 
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legal. The limit of protection was defined by the precise scope of the exceptions, determined by their 
terms and conditions, and by a measure of proportionality, represented by the threshold of ‘serious 
adverse effects’. 
This brief analysis shows that the SCM 1.0 was definitely more generous towards governments as 
compared to the GATT. First, because the default rule on subsidies is a no-ban one. These are allowed 
unless the complainant proves adverse effects. 
Secondly, because the point of balance was de facto, at least in terms of inspiring idea, tipped in 
favour of certain good subsidies (despite the difficulty in proving that these subsidies were actionable 
they were nonetheless expressly made safe). These categories were, however, of limited scope, which, 
in a sense, significantly diminished the practical importance of the idea.
25
 
The comparison is more challenging if we consider the second, and current, version of the SCM 
Agreement – SCM 2.0. The intervening factor is the expiry of the category of non-actionability. In a 
word, the full legal security which this granted (up to the limit of serious adverse effects) is now gone. 
Which set of rules – the GATT or the SCM 2.0 - is more generous towards government? The 
answer is not fully clear. On the one hand, the GATT still has more definite prohibitions than the SCM 
Agreement but these can in principle be justified if the defendant manages to rely on GATT XX. (It is, 
however, important to highlight that GATT Article XX general exceptions are for the defendant to be 
established and, as litigation shows, this has not been easy.) On the other hand, although the 
exceptions of non-actionability have gone, the default position is still that subsidies – whose simple 
legal existence is based on the proof of derogation/discrimination -
26
 are not per se prohibited. Their 
objection is based on the proof of adverse effects and it is for the claimant to prove that we have them. 
This is what an analysis of the law is telling us. This analysis begs another crucial question – which 
is not legal but, once again, requests a ‘factual’ analysis. What does the best policy practice tell us 
about ‘good’ green energy or environmental subsidies? Can we think of measures of support which, in 
order to achieve their desired goals, need to cause adverse effects? How probable is this? Do we have 
a meaningful risk that some good green subsidies may in the process also distort trade? Can 
governments considering support measures design or implement them in such a way that these 
negative effects are minimized, if not eliminated? How much allowance should the regulatory 
framework make for the complexity, and sometimes experimental nature, of certain policies? 
In a word, where do Members want the point of balance of the disciplines to be? What type of 
practical and symbolic signals do they want to give with respect to good and bad subsidies? What type 
of legal security do they aim to grant? What type of flexibility should governments have, especially 
considering that the fight of climate change is a complex one and the success and effects of the 
policies may be uncertain?
27
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 We have also not considered in our assessment the presumptions of adverse effects under Article 6.1 of the SCM 
Agreement. These were ideally the counter-part of the exceptions of the non-actionability provision. The reason for not 
considering them is that their normative innovation – the inversion of the burden of proof in favour of the complainant in 
certain cases - did not touch on the extra-value of legal security granted by the justifications of Article 8. 
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identical. But – and we come to the crucial point – proof of derogation or discrimination is not enough to object to a 
subsidy. You need to prove a specific trade impact to have them banned. See Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and 
State Aid – WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at pp. 285-286. 
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In conclusion, the question is not ultimately whether there is full coherence in the WTO system 
(although one would in principle expect this, unless there are specific reasons for divergences in 
treatment). The issue is whether the current point balance of subsidy laws is acceptable – in the light 
of the economic, political and legal circumstances of the XXIst century.  
The fact that we have not had many challenges to energy subsidies may be good evidence that in 
the end Members have so far been happy with the status quo. Against mounting litigiousness and 
claims, and investment and competition etc, one wonders whether this scenario still reflect what is 
needed. This is – at the very least – a legitimate question to ask. 
Trade-offs. The second idea, partly implied in the previous concept of balance, that explains the 
difficulty in determining the point of balance of subsidy disciplines, or indeed renegotiating it, is that 
of the trade-offs that are in inherent in subsidization. 
Subsidies are ambivalent also because they may cause various – positive and at the same time 
negative - effects. As we have noted elsewhere, what underlines any policy decision and any legal 
compromise is a trade-off.
28
 Economic distortions are thus accepted if, in view of the preferences and 
choices of the granting government, it is expected that the benefits will be greater. There is no 
precision or inevitability in where the line is drawn (which reminds of the concept of point of balance 
above). The main difficulty, however, comes when negative and positive effects are produced in 
different countries, since it is not easy to make and to gain acceptance for transnational trade-offs. In 
these cases, the policy discourse clearly transcends the domestic and local level to reach the 
international and global one. Complex issues of settlement of conflicts of interests enter into play. This 
scenario may explain the stalemate Members are in when even thinking of changing WTO rules.  
The recently suggest link of law reform discourse to the idea of ‘public goods’, which is 
particularly relevant when one talks of common challenges like the fight of climate change, may thus 
be a welcome move to break this stalemate.
29
 
5. The role and the limitations of the jurisprudence 
It should be clear, by now, why subsidy laws are notoriously unclear. The ultimate reason for this is 
that Members have – and have always had – different views on subsidization.30 And these views do 
change with time, and with the rise or demise of certain stakeholders. Ideologies also come and go. As 
repeatedly noted, technology develops, markets evolve, and the political economy alters. For these 
reasons, fundamental features of subsidy laws – such as the definition itself of what constitutes a 
subsidy or the conclusion that a certain subsidy is good or bad – have always been very controversial. 
Law can be clarified by and through jurisprudence. This is - in the end – the most important 
contribution of courts to the administration of justice. But there is a limit to this possibility. If WTO 
Panels and the Appellate Body can – and must – provide clarification on certain issues, it is also 
equally clear that there is a line that cannot be trespassed. Courts are ‘agents’ and not ‘principals’.31 
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Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO’ (2014) Journal of International Economic Law, 
pp. 11-47, at p. XXX. Se also Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy, n. 28 above, at p. 55. 
30
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They cannot create law by filling gaps and making fundamental decisions on what is good and what is 
bad. 
This is, according to the numerous and detailed commentaries to date, the main problem with the 
benefit interpretations of the Panel majority and the Appellate Body in the Canada – Renewable 
Energy/FIT disputes. 
The WTO dispute settlement was called to decide whether Ontario’s feed-in tariff (‘FIT’) system, 
which provides incentives to renewable energy producers and critically includes a local content 
requirement, was in line with WTO laws on national treatment and subsidies. After easily disposing of 
the local content requirement, which was patently in breach of the prohibition of non-discrimination, 
the Panel and the Appellate Body were both asked to establish whether the measure was also a 
prohibited subsidy. The determination whether the FIT was a subsidy was the preliminary step of this 
analysis. It this respect it was necessary to conclude that the incentive scheme was really providing a 
benefit to its recipients. Both courts rejected the claims, arguments and benchmarks put forward by the 
claimants, and concluded that they were not in a position to find for the existence of a benefit. 
The Appellate Body’s reasoning is particularly important, and has been subject of much analysis 
and discussion. In a nutshell, the World Trade Court introduced two innovations to its long-standing 
jurisprudence on the benefit analysis under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. It first required that a full 
market definition be carried out.
32
 This exercise is functional to identify the universe within which the 
appropriate market benchmarks can be found. Crucially, the Appellate Body found that this analysis 
should not stop at the demand-side substitutability but should extend to consider the supply-side.
33
 
After concluding that the market at issue in the case was that of renewable energy only (as opposed to 
the broader energy market),
34
 the Appellate Body introduced its second innovation. It distinguished 
two scenarios. Those where governments (simply) create markets and those where they intervene in 
already existing markets.
35
 Importantly, the former is not ‘in and of itself’ a subsidy. It also transpires 
that, in the first scenario, the key requirement that government creative action should satisfy to profit 
from this shelter is that the action of support is proportionate and not excessive. In sum, if we have a 
new market and the creative act is simply conducive to bring this market into existence, WTO subsidy 
laws do not apply. It is clear that, through this interpretation, the Appellate Body managed to take 
certain forms of subsidization in the clean energy sector outside of subsidy control. 
Our assessment of this decision is negative. In other writings we have severely criticized both the 
Panel (majority) and the Appellate Body.
36
 The burning question was: How is it possible that what is 
almost a textbook example of subsidy has turned out not to be a subsidy at all?
37
 More specifically, we 
are of the view that their interpretation of the notion of benefit amounts to a fundamental 
misconstruction of the law. The result is a limited but unwarranted carve-out for certain types of 
subsidies from subsidy disciplines. The potential implications of this exception are troublesome, 
especially for transparency and subsidy control at large. If our reading is correct, it is desirable that 
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 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.171 et seq. 
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 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.178. 
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 Appellate Body Report, para. 5.188. 
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litigation on renewable energy subsidies’ (2014) Journal of World Trade, pp. 895-938; Aaron Cosbey and Luca Rubini, 
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future decisions limit the impact of this decision. In a recent analysis, we have speculated about this 
and have eventually concluded that this may not be possible. 
38
 
Significantly, the large majority of the various commentaries on the case to date are in agreement 
with conclusion that the Appellate Body (and the Panel majority before it) went too far.
39
 
The Canada – Renewable Energy/FIT ruling is an excellent example of the difficulties in the 
interpretation of subsidy laws highlighted in the previous paragraph. It also exemplifies well the 
difficulties of delegating fundamental decisions to dispute settlement.
40
 
Now, if the law is uncertain and unsound, and case-law cannot really help in improving the 
situation and firmly tell us what type of government intervention is good and what is bad, what should 
be done? 
6. The only real option 
This final section simply sketches that, in our view, is the only way forward: law reform. The reader 
will only find few ideas. Our mandate – the definition of the current green space allowed by WTO 
subsidy laws with respect to support to electricity – has been fulfilled. Most crucially, space 
constraints do not allow us to develop this whole new line of analysis. 
There is broad agreement in the scholarship that reform of subsidies rules is needed.
41
 By law 
reform, however, reference is normally made to new substantive disciplines specifically permitting 
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certain good subsidies.
42
 While agreeing with most of what is said and proposed, we adopt a broader 
notion of ‘reform’, one that is ‘process-based’. 
It is crucial to consider law reform for what it is, especially in the international arena. A process. 
This means that we should not think only, or immediately, at what the substantive disciplines should 
emerge from reform. This is the outcome of the process. The suggestion made in these few comments 
is that the focus and energy should be on how to start and design the process so that it creates the right 
conditions for possible, future negotiations. 
As of now, the conditions for new hard, binding law on subsidies do not seem to be present.
43
 For 
this reason, it is difficult to expect meaningful deliberations by Member representatives on subsidy 
issues. This is particularly true after the Appellate Body invested decisions taken with the Committees 
with the value of binding law.
44
 Against this scenario, it is difficult to expect government 
representatives to make statements that could then be held against them in litigation.  
There is another dimension to reform than actual deliberation, which is preliminary to actual 
negotiations and decisions, that of knowledge generation. 
What is fundamental, if we accept that the current regulatory framework is not satisfactory and we 
are serious about the need for change, is to kick-in the process for reform and frame it in the right way. 
Reform – and their climax: negotiations – if they will ever come, must be duly prepared. You need to 
have discussions started, and for discussions to be meaningful and advance knowledge and 
understanding, it is necessary to rely as much as possible on facts and data and on their assessment. 
The exercise is finalized at assessing the subsidy practices of Members and evaluating their effects and 
effectiveness. This – it is hoped – could clarify the terms of the debate and facilitate diplomatic 
discussion and negotiations when the right political conditions are present. In this respect, the use of 
experts should also be welcomed. The right venues for this process of knowledge generation should be 
carefully chosen.  
Use could be made of the mechanisms that are already ‘built-in’ the SCM Agreement, such as the 
Group of Experts or the creation of bodies ‘subsidiary’ to the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures,
45
 or in the WTO at large, for example the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
It is again a matter of rendering devices negotiated and agreed on in the Uruguay Round operational. 
Alternatively, if it is believed appropriate because it would ensure better  
In any event, the two key words should be pragmatism and imagination – the essence of the spirit 
of the GATT. What is sought for is not a revolution but a thought-of evolution of the system and its 
disciplines. This is the narrative that should prevail and should re-assure Members, and all relevant 
stakeholders, that they are in the driving-seat, and that no by-the-back-door coup is ventilated. 
 
  
                                                     
42
 Reform could be achieved in various ways. Rob Howse, n. 17 above, put forward the idea of an interpretative 
understanding. 
43
 It remains to be seen whether the recent developments (such as the Bali Ministerial package; Green Goods initiative) can 
be positive indications of a changing mood and appetite. 
44
 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras. 373-378.  
45
 See Article 24.2 of the SCM Agreement. 
ASCM disciplines and recent WTO case law developments: what space for ‘green’ subsidies? 
15 
Author contacts: 
 
Luca Rubini 
Birmingham Law School 
University of Birmingham 
Edgbaston 
B15 2TT Birmingham, UK 
Email: l.rubini@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
 
